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Explaining the Pattern of CSDP-Operations:  
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Tim Haesebrouck1
Abstract: The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has mainly been used 
to deploy small-scale operations, which generally did not provide the member states with 
clear security benefits. This article combines insights from different theories of international 
relations to explain this disappointing track record. It argues that liberal theories adequately 
identify the domestic pressures the member states’ governments need to accommodate in 
the area of crisis management. Constructivism, on its part, properly emphasises the diverging 
strategic cultures of the member states. Both theories however fail to explain why domestic 
pressures and diverging strategic cultures lead to small-scale operations. Rational-choice 
institutionalism does provide a convincing explanation for the latter by drawing attention 
to the CSDP’s ineffective institutional design. Realism, in turn, is best positioned to explain 
why the CSDP was not designed more effectively, by emphasising the reluctance of states to 
transfer sovereignty to international organisations. The article concludes by discussing two 
measures that could alleviate the impact of the identified impediments on the CSDP’s track 
record: devising a CSDP-strategy and adapting the consensus rule. However, since the latter 
is very unlikely in the near future, the CSDP is not expected to develop into a more effective 
framework for crisis management.
Keywords: Common Security and Defence Policy, liberal theories, constructivism, 
rational-choice institutionalism, institutional design, realism, sovereignty
Introduction
Over fifteen years after France and the United Kingdom agreed in Saint-Malo that “the 
[European] Union must have a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so”, Europeans seem 
to be “sorely disappointed” with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).2 
One of the main reasons for this disappointment is the pattern of operations deployed 
under the aegis of the policy. Although an impressive number of CSDP-operations has been 
launched, these were generally of a relatively small scale and rather unambitious. Moreover, 
 1 Tim Haesebrouck, MA in EU-studies (Ghent University 2010), is a PhD researcher at Ghent University, Belgium. 
His research interests include the Responsibility to Protect, military intervention and the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy. He has previously published articles in International Politics, European Foreign Affairs Review and 
Internationale Spectator. E-mail: Tim.Haesebrouck@UGent.be. 
 2 Daniel Fiott, ‘The CSDP Is Dead, Long Live the CSDP?’, European Geostrategy, 2014 at 1, Maartje Rutten, ‘From 
Saint-Malo to Nice’, European defence: Core documents, Chaillot Paper, 4 (2001) at 22.
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critical evaluations consistently conclude that these operations barely made “a dent in serious 
defence issues” and question whether any of them had a long-term impact on the ground.3 
On top of that, the CSDP remained strikingly inert when confronted with crises in which the 
EU had a significant stake, like Gadhafi’s atrocious repression of the Libyan uprising or the 
2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali.4 How can this pattern of operations be explained? Why have 
an impressive number of small-scale operations that did not provide the member states with 
clear security benefits been launched under the aegis of the CSDP, while the policy remained 
oddly inert when confronted with crises in which the member states did have a significant 
stake? The answer to this question essentially determines the response to what is perhaps the 
most fundamental question: can the CSDP evolve into a more effective framework for crisis 
management or are the impediments that hampered its development so fundamental that 
there can be little hope of overcoming them?
A large number of policy-oriented works have been written on the practical obstacles 
that hampered the CSDP’s development, drawing attention to the absence of operational 
headquarters, the lack of adequate military capabilities, and the failure to identify clear 
strategic objectives for the policy.5 In line with the general trend in scholarship on the CSDP, 
there are however no theory-informed studies on the subject.6 This is unfortunate, since 
theoretical approaches drawn from the wider study of international relations can provide 
valuable insights on the limits and possibilities of the CSDP. In this article, I aim to fill this 
gap in the scholarly literature by drawing on theories of international relations to explain 
the pattern of CSDP-operations and determine the obstacles that hampered the CSDP’s 
development. Because no single theory can be expected to explain the complex dynamics 
behind CSDP operations, I draw on insights from liberal, constructivist, institutionalist and 
realist theories of international relations.7 Subsequently, I suggest two measures that could 
alleviate the identified impediments and allow the CSDP to evolve into a more effective 
framework for crisis management: devising a strategy for the CSDP and amending its 
institutional design. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I describe the pattern of CSDP 
operations. In the second section, I draw on theories of international relations to explain this 
pattern. In the third section, two feasible initiatives to increase the CSDP’s effectiveness are 
discussed, after which I recapitulate the article’s major findings in the conclusions.
 3 See inter alia: Fiott, ‘The CSDP Is Dead, Long Live the CSDP?’, Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, ESDP in Practice: 
Crisis Management without Strategic Planning’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15/1-2 (2011), 178-99, Bastian 
Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’, Studia Diplomatica, 62/3 (2009), 37-42, Daniel Keohane, ‘Lessons 
from EU Peace Operations’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15/1-2 (2011), 200-17.
 4 Rik Coolsaet, Sven Biscop, and Jo Coelmont, ‘Mali: Another European Intervention without the EU?’, Egmont Security 
Policy Brief, 42 (2013), Nicole Koenig, ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?’, The International 
Spectator, 46/4 (2011), 11-30.
 5 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces: The Making of a Distinctive Power (Routledge, 
2013). Nik Hynek, ‘EU Crisis Management after the Lisbon Treaty: Civil–Military Coordination and the Future of the 
EU OHQ’, European Security, 20/1 (2011), 81-102, Luis Simón, Command and Control? Planning for EU Military 
Operations (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010). Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll, ‘The 
Struggle for Value in European Defence’, Survival, 54/1, 53-82.
 6 Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle, and Anand Menon, ‘Security Co-Operation Beyond the Nation-State: The EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49/1 (2011), 1-21 at 2.
 7 Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa, The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact (Basingstokes: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) at 3.
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The disappointing pattern of CSDP operations
Ever since its very beginnings in 1998, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
has been focusing on crisis management.8 In their joint declaration in St-Malo, the Heads 
of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom explicitly agreed that the EU 
needed a military capacity to “respond to international crises.”9 The conclusions of the 1999 
Cologne European Council further specified that the EU wanted to develop an autonomous 
capacity for performing the “Petersberg tasks”, which include “humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.”10 The type of operations the EU aimed to conduct was further expanded 
during the 2000 Feira Council, where the member states agreed to develop capabilities 
for conducting civilian operations in the areas of the rule of law, civilian administration, 
civil protection and policing.11 In 2003, the European Security Strategy added disarmament 
operations, missions to combat terrorism and security sector reform to the CSDP’s task list. 
Arguably, the most impressive aspect of the CSDP’s short history is the sheer number 
of times it actually served as a framework for crisis management operations. At the time of 
writing in January 2015, no fewer than 32 missions have been launched under the CSDP-
framework. However, when looking at the scale and ambition of these operations, the 
level of activity is far less impressive. The bulk of the CSDP’s operational activity consists of 
small-scale and/or civilian operations.12 In consequence, the around 6,000 troops that were 
averagely deployed under the CSDP-framework between 2003 and 2012 only constitute a 
small share of the 53,000 European troops active in crisis management operations during the 
same period.13 Furthermore, CSDP operations were generally rather risk averse and not very 
ambitious. Most missions did not involve the deployment of coercive force or were deployed 
for a very limited period of time.14 Moreover, although operations generally achieved the 
goals of their limited mandates, analysts consistently question their long-term impact on the 
area of operations as well as whether they provided the member states with strong security 
benefits.15 On top of that, no operations were deployed through the CSDP in response to 
crises that did pose a clear threat to European interests, like when the stability of Europe’s 
immediate neighbourhood was threatened by the Tuareg rebellion in Mali or Gaddafi’s 
atrocious repression of Libya’s popular uprising. 
 8 Luis Simón, ‘CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or out of Business?’, The International Spectator, 
47/3 (2012), 100-15 at 101-03.
 9 Rutten, ‘From Saint-Malo to Nice’, at 22.
 10 Ibid., at 163.
 11 Maria Raquel Freire, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy: History, Structures and Capabilities’, in Michael; 
Ostrauskaite Merlingen, Rasa (ed.), European Security and Defence Policy an Implementation Perspective (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 9-25 at 12-15.
 12 Alyson J. K. Bailes, ‘The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?’, 
International Affairs, 84/1 (2008), 115-30 at 123, Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’, at 38.
 13 Giegerich and Nicoll, ‘The Struggle for Value in European Defence’, at 59.
 14 Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’, at 37.
 15 See inter alia: Asseburg and Kempin, ‘ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning’, Catherine 
Gegout, ‘The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2006)’, International 
Peacekeeping, 16/2 (2009), 231-44, Giegerich, ‘European Military Crisis Management’, Keohane, ‘Lessons from EU 
Peace Operations’, Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or 
Europe?’, International Peacekeeping, 16/2 (2009), 245-60.
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This should not necessarily induce a negative assessment of the viability or usefulness of 
the CSDP as a framework for operations. The CSDP is still a relatively young policy, which 
could be expected to be developing into a more important framework for crisis management. 
However, exactly the opposite evolution seems to be taking place. The number of personnel 
deployed under CSDP peaked at 9,000 in 2008, after which it dropped dramatically, resulting 
in a total of only 4,500 in 2012.16 This downward pattern can mostly be accounted for by a 
loss of appetite for new operations. While on average one new mission was launched every 
three months during the first five years after the CSDP became fully operational, only one 
new operation was established in the three years between 2008 and 2011 (see figure 1). 
Between 2012 and 2014, eight new operations were deployed under the CSDP-framework. 
However, even EUFOR RCA, the most ambitious of these recent operations, is of a far more 
narrow scale than the largest missions conducted under the CSDP before the downward 
pattern started.17
Figure 1 – Yearly Breakdown of New CSDP operations18
In summary, the CSDP has not been used for launching large-scale, ambitious operations 
in response to crises where European interests were clearly at stake. Moreover, the downward 
pattern in CSDP-operations suggests it will not likely be used for such operations in the near 
future. Unsurprisingly, this state of affairs gave rise to a widespread disappointment on the 
CSDP’s track record. In a report of the renowned European Council of Foreign Relations, 
former European Defence Agency Chief Executive Nick Witney and his co-authors for 
example assert that “the CSDP is doing more harm than good to the EU’s reputation, and 
 16 Tim Haesebrouck and Melanie Van Meirvenne, ‘Eufor RCA and CSDP Crisis Management Operations: Back on Track?’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 20/2 (2015), at 29. Tim Haesebrouck and Melanie Van Meirvenne, ‘EU-Geleide Crisis 
Management-Operaties: Minder, Kleinschaliger en Pragmatischer’, Internationale Spectator, 67/2 (2013), 28-32.
 17 Tim Haesebrouck, ‘Interventie in De Centraal Afrikaanse Republiek: Het Eerste Succesverhaal Voor R2P?’, 
Internationale Spectator, 68/5 (2014), 28-32.
 18 Data retrieved from ISIS, ‘CSDP Mission Chart October 2014,’ (retrieved from www.csdpmap.eu on 30 December 2014).
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to the contribution to global security that member states might otherwise be making under 
the more effective auspices of the UN, or simply as coalitions of the willing”, Daniel Fiott, 
editor of “European Geostrategy”, contends that “Europeans have been sorely disappointed 
with, or even deluded by, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy” 
and Jolyon Howorth, one of the most prominent scholars of European defence cooperation, 
argues that “even after twenty years of preparation, the EU’s capacity to mount a significant 
military mission in its own backyard is grossly inadequate.”19 The next section builds on 
theories of international relations to shed light on the CSDP’s disappointing pattern of 
operational activity. 
International relations theories and the pattern of CSDP operations
In spite of their small scale and lack of ambition, the crisis management operations 
conducted under the CSDP have spurred a huge body of literature. However, this mainly 
consists of normative inquiries on the impact of military operations on the EU’s global role 
and detailed empirical investigations of the operational record of the CSDP.20 In consequence, 
there are few theory-informed studies on the pattern of CSDP operations. An important 
exception is the work of Benjamin Pohl, who builds on liberal international relations theory 
to develop a general argument about the drivers behind CSDP operations.21 Furthermore, 
several authors have drawn on insights from realist, constructivist and institutionalist theories 
of international relations to formulate expectations on the scope and ambition of the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy. This section builds on these insights to explain why 
the CSDP has not been used for conducting large-scale, ambitious operations in response 
to crises where European interests were clearly at stake, in spite of the large number of 
operations launched under its aegis.
Liberalism: Domestic Politics Matter
In one of the rare theory-informed studies on the pattern of CSDP-operations, Pohl draws 
attention to the explanatory power of a key argument of liberal theories of international 
relations: domestic politics matter for international relations.22 According to liberal theories, 
governments primarily focus on what their domestic societies want when they formulate 
 19 Fiott, ‘The CSDP Is Dead, Long Live the CSDP?’, Nick Witney et al., ‘Rebooting EU Foreign Policy’, ECFR Policy 
Brief, 114 (2014) at 6. Jolyon Howorth, ‘CSDP and Nato Post-Libya: Towards the Rubicon?’ Egmont Security Policy 
Brief No. 35, July 2012, (2012) at 3.
 20 e.g. Lisbeth Aggestam, ‘Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?’, International Affairs, 84/1 (2008), 1-11, Asseburg and 
Kempin, ‘ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning’, Giovanni; Helly Grevi, Damien; Keohane, 
Daniel, European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 
2009) 450, Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 13/2 (2006), 182-99, Michael; Ostrauskaite Merlingen, Rasa (ed.), European Security and Defence Policy an 
Implementation Perspective (New York: Roudledge, 2008).
 21 Benjamin Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, European Security, 22/3 (2013), 307-
25, Benjamin Pohl, ‘To What Ends? Governmental Interests and European Union (Non-) Intervention in Chad and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, Cooperation and Conflict, 49/2 (2014), 191-211.
 22 Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, at 316.; see also Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International Organization, 51/4 (1997), 513-53.
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foreign policy. Although Pohl does not clarify which variant of liberal theory he applies, 
his argument corresponds to “Ideational Liberalism”, which contends that “core domestic 
social identities” constitute an important source of state preferences.23 Pohl argues that these 
domestic identities incite two countervailing pressures in the area of crisis management. 
On the one hand, governments want to demonstrate “that they are capable of influencing 
international events in line with domestic values and priorities”; on the other hand they 
do not want to be accused of “paying too high a price in treasure or causalities for foreign 
policy projects which turn out ill-conceived.”24 In other words, “governments need to pre-
empt the twin dangers of standing accused of pointless activism and excessive risk-taking or 
complacency and weakness.” According to Pohl, these countervailing pressures explain why 
CSDP operations have been risk-averse, limited in time and generally unambitious.
By drawing adequate attention to the domestic pressure on the Member States’ 
governments to demonstrate they are capable actors in international relations, Pohl’s liberal 
theory of the drivers behind CSDP-operations accounts for the impressive number of missions 
that were launched under the policy. However, the argument does not fully account for the 
pattern of operations, since the small-scale operations that were conducted under the CSDP 
could not reasonably be expected to help governments demonstrate that they are “capable 
of influencing international events.” As mentioned above, critical assessments of CSDP-
operations do not suggests that these have impressed the foreign policy elite in the media, 
non-governmental organizations or academia, whose opinion, according to Pohl, is supposed 
to confer domestic legitimacy on the government’s foreign policy. By only conducting small-
scale operations, governments only seem to pre-empt the danger of “standing accused of 
pointless activism and excessive risk-taking”, but not of standing accused of “complacency 
and weakness.”25 
Pohl’s liberal explanation fails to provide a convincing explanation for the pattern of the 
CSDP-operations for two reasons. First of all, he largely ignores a fundamental assumption of 
liberal theory: it is the “configuration of interdependent state preferences” that “determines 
state behaviour.”26 While liberalism emphasises the importance of domestic preferences, it 
also accepts that the interaction between states is important for explaining collective state 
behaviour. According to Andrew Moravcsik, one of the leading scholars on liberal international 
relations theory, collective state behaviour should be analysed as “a two-stage process of 
constrained social choice. States first define preferences […] Then they debate, bargain, or 
fight to particular agreements – a second stage explained by realist and institutionalist (as 
well as liberal) theories of strategic interaction.” 27 A narrow focus on domestic preferences 
can thus not fully explain the pattern of the CSDP-operations and needs to be complemented 
with insights from realist and institutionalist theories. Second, Pohl overemphasises the 
shared interest of EU governments in “demonstrating that they are capable of influencing 
international events in line with domestic values and priorities” and hereby, underestimates 
 23 The two other major variants of liberalism are “Commercial Liberalism” and “Republican Liberalism”, see Andrew 
Moravcsik, ‘The New Liberalism’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 234-54.
 24 Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, at 317.
 25 Benjamin Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, European Security, (2012), 1-19 at 318.
 26 Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, at 520.
 27 Ibid., at 544.
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the significant differences between the domestic values and priorities of the EU Member 
states.28 In order to account for these differences, insights from constructivist theories on the 
strategic culture of the member states must be taken into account.
Constructivism: Norms Matter
Constructivist international relations theories draw attention to the importance of “norms, 
identities and cultures” for understanding political outcomes.29 Constructivists are divided on 
the relative importance of domestic versus international environments.30 While systematic 
constructivists focus on how the international environment shapes state identities, other 
constructivists stress the importance of domestic environments. Insights from the latter strand 
provide most insights on the pattern of CSDP-operations, since they draw proper attention 
to “the differences between EU Member states in terms of their foreign policy traditions, 
and strategic and bureaucratic cultures.”31 Scholars building on this variant of constructivism 
generally examine the CSDP from a strategic culture perspective. “Norms within the context 
of strategic culture can be conceptualised as beliefs about what is appropriate, legitimate, 
or just regarding the goals and modalities concerning the use of force.”32 Elites embedded 
in different strategic cultures are expected to make different choices when confronted with 
a similar situation.33 The latter can hamper effective collective action in crisis management 
operations. “It could lead to an inability for initiating or sustaining operations due to 
lack of public support for the goals of a mission […] or incoherent strategies and rules of 
engagement, or insufficient resources and delays of action.”34 To explain the small scale 
and lack of ambition of the CSDP operations, constructivist theories would thus point to the 
diverging norms of the EU member states on the use of force. In other words, they would 
draw attention to the absence of a common European strategic culture.
Several scholars have examined the extent to which the strategic cultures of the 
member states diverge.35 Generally, they conclude that there are persistent differences and 
incompatibilities between the strategic cultures of the EU-members. For example, Jolyon 
Howorth argued in 2002 that six dichotomies needed to be transcended if the EU was ever 
to move towards a common approach:
 28 Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, at 317.
 29 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration: A Reader, eds Neill Nugent and William Paterson (The 
European Union Series; Basingstokes: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006) at 393.
 30 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), at 170-171.
 31 Christoph O. Meyer and Eva Strickmann, ‘Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact 
in European Defence’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49/1 (2011), 61-81, at 64
 32 Christoph O. Meyer, ‘The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research 
for the European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power’, International Studies Quarterly, 55/3 (2011), 669-90 at 677.
 33 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security, 19/4 (1995), 32-64 at 35.
 34 Christoph O. Meyer, ‘European Defence: Why Institutional Socialization Is Not Enough?’, Oxford Journal of Good 
Governance, 2/1 (2005), 51-54 at 54.,
 35 Alessia Biava, Margriet Drent, and Graeme P. Herd, ‘Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture: An 
Analytical Framework’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49/6 (2011), 1227-48, Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Is There 
a Security Culture in the Enlarged European Union?’, The International Spectator, 41/3 (2006/07/01 2006), 7-23, J. 
M. Howorth, ‘The CESDP and the Forging of a European Security Culture ‘, Politique européenne, 4/8 (2002), at 21.
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“differences between allies and neutrals, between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists”, 
between those favouring power projection and those prioritising territorial defence, between 
emphases on military as opposed to civilian instruments, between large states and small states, 
between weapons systems providers and weapons systems consumers, between nuclear and 
non-nuclear states.”36
Five years later, he concluded that “some of those dichotomies have begun to be resolved, 
but most have not.”37 According to Christoph Meyer , “the Achilles heel” of the CSDP is the 
lack of consensus on whether force can be used in very hostile environments.38 This can be 
expected to severely hamper the ability of the CSDP to act as a framework for high-intensity 
operations:
”In order to achieve a higher ambition regarding the use of force […] one would need to 
see the gradual transformation or upgrading of particularly the more pacificist or defensive-
minded strategic cultures toward accepting the legitimacy of military interventions not only for 
humanitarian but also for realpolitik reasons, a higher tolerance for risks, lower thresholds for the 
authorization of force, and a higher acceptance of working with highly activist countries such 
as the United States, or indeed the European Union, with increasingly ambitious definitions of 
goals for security and defence policy.”39
Next to the persistent differences between the member states, there are also indications 
of an increasing convergence between their strategic cultures.40 Meyer, for instance, found 
substantial agreement amongst the member states on the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention and a general preference for civilian over military instruments. Other authors 
even claim that a distinct EU strategic culture has evolved, in which there is a broad consensus 
on a comprehensive approach to security and a preference for non-military instruments.41 
The risk-averse nature of the CSDP operations and the prevalence of civilian over military 
missions is thus in line with constructivist expectations on the constraining impact of norms: 
collective action under the CSDP-framework was largely limited to areas in which norms 
converged.
However, constructivists have been predominately occupied with questions about 
whether and how norms converge into a common European strategic culture, not with the 
political outcomes of the interaction between states with diverging strategic cultures. In 
consequence, constructivist theories do not explain why CSDP operations were consistently 
 36 Howorth, ‘The CESDP and the Forging of a European Security Culture ‘, at 4.
 37 J. M. Howorth, ‘Towards a European Strategic Culture’, in Jolyon Howorth (ed.), Security and Defence in the 
European Union (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007), 178-207 at 179.
 38 Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the 
European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 209 at 185.
 39 Meyer, ‘The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the 
European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power’, at 680.
 40 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report’, International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 81/4 (2005), 801-20, Edwards, ‘Is There a Security Culture in 
the Enlarged European Union?’, Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture Changing Norms on Security and 
Defence in the European Union.
 41 Biava, Drent, and Herd, ‘Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework’, Per M. 
Norheim-Martinsen, ‘EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End’, Contemporary Security Policy, 32/3 
(2011), 517-34.
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in line with the preferences of countries with more “pacifist” strategic cultures instead of with 
the preferences of countries with a more “active” strategic culture.42 In summary, constructivist 
approaches draw adequate attention to differences between the EU member states, but in 
order to account for their collective behaviour, they need to be complemented with insights 
from theories capable of explaining the results of their interaction: institutionalism and 
realism.
Rational-Choice Institutionalism: Institutions Matter
The basic assumption of institutionalism is that “institutions matter in world politics.”43 
According to the rational-choice variant, states create institutions to solve cooperation 
problems. Two specific problems need solving before an operation can be launched. First, 
the member states need to agree on whether an operation is appropriate, its specific goals 
and the best way to achieve these. Second, they need to agree on the division of the burden 
of this operation.44 Given the persistent differences between the member states’ strategic 
cultures, bargaining over when and how an operation should be launched constitutes a 
challenging process. Agreeing on the division of its burden, on the other hand, will be 
difficult because states want to avoid domestic criticism for “paying too high a price in blood 
or treasure.”45 Especially in military operations, which entail a risk of military casualties and 
significant financial costs, member states will be reluctant to make contributions that are 
fully commensurate to their capabilities. Instead, they can be expected to try to ride cheap 
on the efforts of others, hoping that the latter “will do the job that the actor would like 
to see done.”46 In fact, successful free or easy riding is one of the most effective ways for 
national governments to accommodate the countervailing pressures mentioned by Pohl. By 
only making symbolic contributions, governments can pretend to be “capable of influencing 
international events”, without facing the risk of being accused of “pointless activism.”47 
However, if all member states attempt to ride cheap and only make minor contributions, 
only relatively small operations will be deployed. 
The disappointing pattern of CSDP-operations suggests that the CSDP’s institutional 
design is not apt to solve these cooperation problems. An important institutional characteristic 
of the CSDP is that it is based on consensus decision-making: every member state has to 
agree before an operation can be launched.48 Since many member states have a pacifist or 
defensive-minded strategic culture (cf. supra), the need to arrive at a consensus disposes the 
 42 Meyer, ‘The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the 
European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power’, at 680.
 43 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, ‘Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International 
Regimes’, Mershon International Studies Review, 40/2 (1996), 177-228 at 178.
 44 Anand Menon, ‘Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten’, International Affairs, 85/2 (2009), 227-46 at 237.
 45 Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, at 317.
 46 Joseph Lepgold, ‘Nato’s Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem’, International Security, 23/1 (1998), 78-106 at 87.
 47 Pohl, ‘The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations’, at 317.
 48 Anand Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, 53/3 (2011/07/01 2011), 75-90 at 82. Sten 
Rynning, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’, Security Dialogue, 34/4 (2003), 479-96 at 487, Asle 
Toje, The European Union as a Small Power after the Post-Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 250 at 
132.
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EU towards lower level commitments, for which consensus is easiest achieved. A second 
important feature of the CSDP’s institutional design is the lack of obligations to contribute 
significantly to operations. While all member states need to agree before an operation can be 
launched, every state is free to decide whether it seconds personnel to the area of operations. 
In civilian operations, the financial costs are covered by the community budget. However, in 
military operations, only the so-called common costs are shared between all member states, 
which usually only cover around 10% of the total operations costs.49 In the absence of a 
“centralised enforcement mechanism” that obliges states to make significant contributions 
to operations, member states will be tempted to try to ride cheap on the efforts of others, 
resulting in a pattern of small-scale and unambitious operations.50
To make matters worse, the combination of consensus decision-making and the lack of an 
obligation to contribute makes the CSDP an unappealing framework for the governments that 
see most benefits in deploying an operation. On its face, conducting operations through the 
CSDP should be an attractive option, since it allows to share the burden between the member 
states. However, using the CSDP-framework requires compromising on the operation’s goals 
to arrive at a consensus between the member states. Governments in favour of launching an 
operation thus face a trade-off between the material benefits of sharing the burden with the 
other member states and the policy loss that results from compromising on its goals. If the 
benefits of burden-sharing do not outweigh the disadvantages of the policy-loss, they can 
be expected to conduct the operation unilaterally, through an ad hoc coalition or under the 
aegis of other international organisations.
The institutional design of the CSDP causes the member states that are most strongly 
in favour of an operation to gain little support in return for compromising relatively much. 
While consensus decision-making forces them to take the preferences of all other member 
states into account when deciding on an operation’s goals, they have no guarantee that 
these will carry a part of its burden. Moreover, the member states that see most benefits in 
launching an operation are in a weak bargaining position. Since no consensus means no 
operation, the states most strongly in favour of an operation have the highest incentive to 
avoid non-agreement. In consequence, they will be most inclined to moderate their demands. 
Similarly, persistent free-riding creates the risk that an operation is insufficiently resourced 
to achieve its goals. Since the member states with the most at stake in crisis have the highest 
incentive to avoid an under-resourced operation, they can be expected to contribute more 
than proportionately. Member states that see most benefits in launching an operation thus 
need to make a lot of concessions on its goals, in return for relatively little support of the 
other member states. Since member states are less likely to compromise a lot if vital interests 
are at stake, they will be inclined to deploy military operations through other frameworks 
when strong security interests are at stake.
In summary, the institutional design of the CSDP explains why the interaction between 
member states results in a pattern of small-scale operations, deployed in crises where the 
 49 Giovanni Grevi and Daniel Keohane, ‘ESDP Resources’, in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane 
(eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009) (Paris: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 2009), 69-114 at 78.
 50 Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, at 82.
15
Explaining the Pattern of CSDP-Operations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis
member states have few interests at stake. Consensus decision-making disposes the CSDP 
towards lower-level commitments, the lack of an obligation to contribute incites free-riding. 
The combination of these two features makes the CSDP an unattractive framework for states 
that see benefits in launching operations. However, rational-choice theories assume that 
“states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions 
accordingly.”51 In consequence, rational-choice institutionalism cannot explain why the 
CSDP was not designed more effectively. For explaining the latter, realist arguments must be 
taken into account.
Realism: Sovereignty Matters
Realists operate with the core assumption that world politics consists of an international 
anarchy of states, which jealously guard their sovereignty. In consequence, realists do not 
believe that states would cede strong enforcement capacities to supranational institutions.52 
Realist scholars were sceptical about the feasibility of a strong European security and defence 
policy long before it was launched. In 1966, Stanley Hoffman argued from a classical realist 
perspective that integration is not likely in a high politics area like security and defence policy. 
According to Hoffman, the diversity of domestic determinants and geo-historical situations 
results in diverging foreign policy priorities, on which states are not willing to compromise 
for the uncertain result of more integration.53 After the launch of the CSDP, several authors 
reverberated Hoffman’s “observations concerning the uneasy relationship between the 
“high politics” of security and the functional messiness of international integration.”54 Sten 
Rynning builds on Hoffman’s assertions to warn for too high hopes for the CSDP.55 Because 
of Europe’s complex and pluralist history, efforts to push the CSDP too hard will not advance 
the policy but cause it to fail. Adrian Hyde-Price argues from a neorealist perspective that 
“Europe’s great powers will continue to jealously guard their sovereign rights to pursue 
their own foreign and security policy priorities. Consequently the CFSP/ESDP is destined to 
remain firmly intergovernmental.”56 
Scholars have explicitly turned to realist arguments for explaining the two aspects of 
the CSDP’s institutional design that render it ineffective. According to Asle Toje the reason 
for consensus decision-making can be captured in one word: sovereignty.57 “While most 
 51 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, 
International Organization, 55/4 (2001), 761-99 at 762.
 52Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 42/1 (1998), 3-32 at 8. For realist assessments of international organizations see Kenneth N. Waltz, 
‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25/1 (2000), 5-41 at 18-17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The 
False Promise of International Institutions’, ibid. (1994), 5-49.
 53 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’, Daedalus, 
95/3 (1966), 862-915 at 862-64.
 54 J. M. Howorth and A. Menon, ‘Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the United States’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53/5 (2009), 727-44 at 738.
 55 Sten Rynning, ‘Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 
49/1 (2011), 23-42.
 56 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13/2 (2006), 
217-34.
 57 Toje, The European Union as a Small Power after the Post-Cold War, at 138.
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member states would like to carry the weight of 27 states when pursuing their own foreign 
policy objectives, the thought of having foreign policy objectives defined by 26 other states 
is generally less appealing.” Howorth and Menon point to the “reluctance of states to entrust 
matters of high politics to powerful central institutions” for explaining the absence of an 
enforcement mechanism for contributing to operations.58 The institutional design of the 
CSDP thus clearly corresponds to realist expectations on the reluctance of states to cede 
strong enforcement capacities to supranational institutions.
International relations theories and the pattern of CSDP operations
Why has the CSDP not been used for conducting large-scale, ambitious operations in 
response to crises where European interests were clearly at stake, in spite of the large number 
of operations launched under its aegis? In line with the story of the blind men and the elephant 
that Donald Puchala used to grapple with European integration, different schools of thought 
must thus be combined to fully understand what caused the disappointing pattern of CSDP 
operations.59 Liberal theories properly identify the domestic pressures that the member states’ 
governments need to accommodate in the area of crisis management. However, while these 
account for the large number of operations conducted under the CSDP, domestic pressures 
does not explain why these were not sufficiently ambitious to make governments look 
effective in the eyes of domestic constituencies. Constructivism draws proper attention to the 
diverging strategic cultures of the member states, which makes collective operations difficult. 
However, it cannot explain why the interaction between states with different strategic cultures 
consistently results in small-scale operations. Rational-choice institutionalism suggests this 
can be explained by the CSDP’s ineffective institutional design. Realism, in turn, was best 
positioned to explain why the CSDP was not designed more effectively, by emphasising the 
reluctance of states to transfer sovereignty to international organizations. 
Limits and possibilities of the CSDP
In recent years, various attempts have been made to develop the CSDP into a more 
effective framework for crisis management. The most noticeable of these was the December 
2013 European Council meeting, where the heads of state and government of the member 
states agreed that “increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP” constitutes 
a top priority. The insights derived from international relations theories provide valuable 
lessons on whether such a more effective CSDP is possible, as well as on the specific 
initiatives that could get the policy on track. Unfortunately, some of the impediments on the 
CSDP are unlikely to ever fully disappear. In line with realist theories, member states cannot 
reasonably be expected to transfer sovereignty on defence issues. Differences in the strategic 
cultures of the member states are also likely to persist, just like governments will continue to 
have an incentive to shift the burden of operations on the other member states. Two specific 
measures could however alleviate the impact of these obstacles: devising a CSDP-strategy 
and amending the consensus rule.
 58 Howorth and Menon, ‘Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the United States’
 59 Donald J. Puchala, ‘Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 10/3 (1971), 267-84.
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First, the CSDP would become more effective if the member states agreed on a well-
defined strategy for the CSDP, which sets out the priorities and objectives of the policy, as 
well as the “types of operations that can potentially be undertaken to meet them.”60 It would 
be much more difficult for the member states to oppose or not contribute to an operation that 
aims to secure an objective that was previously defined a strategic priority for the CSDP. In 
consequence, such a mission statement would make it easier to agree on whether or not to 
respond to a crisis with a CSDP operation, as well as to assemble the required resources for 
such an operation. In the past, several attempts at devising such a strategy have been made. 
In 2003, the then-High Representative for Common Foreign Policy Javier Solana drafted the 
European Security Strategy. However, this only provides an overall mission statement of the 
EU as an international actor, which, so far, has not been translated into clear objectives and 
priorities for the CSDP. However, during the December 2013 European Council, the heads 
of state and government tasked the High Representative with developing a European Strategy 
on Security and Defence. If this eventually results in agreement on the strategic objectives 
and priorities of the CSDP, the latter could become a more effective framework for crisis 
management.
Second, the CSDP’s effectiveness would increase if the member states amended its 
institutional design. Since the combination of consensus decision making and the lack of 
an obligation to contribute hampered the CSDP’s development, changing these institutional 
characteristics should have a positive impact on the pattern of operations. Insights from 
realism suggest that it is very unlikely that the member states would accept an obligation to 
contribute if the unanimity rule was abolished, since this could force them to contribute to 
operations they do not support. A more feasible alternative would be to preserve consensus 
decision-making, but obliging the member states to carry a more equitable share of the costs 
of the operation. Hereby, the CSDP would become more attractive for states that favour the 
launch of an operation, since the material benefits of sharing the burden of the operation 
would more likely compensate for the policy loss incurred by the requirements of consensus 
decision making. However, obliging all member states to make an equitable contribution 
would make a large-scale operation even less likely, since it would provide states that do not 
fully support the goals of an operation an additional reason to block it.61 It appears that the 
best option is to amend the consensus rule, without increasing the obligation to contribute. 
Adopting less demanding voting rules like Qualified Majority Voting would strengthen 
the bargaining position of states in favour of launching an operation, making the CSDP a 
more attractive framework for conducting operations. Moreover, as long as states would be 
allowed to withhold their resources when they have no interests in an operation, this would 
not necessarily infringe on the sovereignty of the member states and could, in theory, be a 
feasible option.
Agreeing on a CSDP-strategy and amending the consensus rule would only partially solve 
some of the impediments on the CSDP. Qualified Majority Voting still requires significant 
agreement on when and how an operation should be launched, which will still be difficult to 
achieve even if the member states agree on the strategic objectives of the CSDP. Moreover, 
 60 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces: The Making of a Distinctive Power, at 35.
 61 Anand Menon, ‘Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten’, at 239.
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governments can still be expected to try to shift the burden of the operation to the other 
member states. Nevertheless, it would allow the CSDP to evolve into a framework through 
which the EU member states could conduct more ambitious operations. Unfortunately, 
changing the voting rules of the CSDP would require a Treaty revision, which is highly 
unlikely in the near future. In consequence, even a modestly optimistic scenario seems 
improbable.
Conclusion
So far, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy has mainly been used to deploy 
small-scale operations, which generally did not provide the member states with clear security 
benefits. To explain the CSDP’s disappointing track record, this article combined insights from 
different theories of international relations. It argued that liberal theories adequately identify 
the domestic pressures the member states’ governments need to accommodate in the area of 
crisis management, but fail to explain why CSDP-operations were not sufficiently ambitious 
to make governments look effective in the eyes of domestic constituencies. Constructivism, 
in turn, draws attention to the diverging strategic cultures of the member states, which makes 
collective operations difficult. However, it cannot explain why the interaction between states 
with different strategic cultures consistently results in small-scale operations. Rational-choice 
institutionalism does provide a convincing explanation for the latter by drawing attention to 
the CSDP’s ineffective institutional design. Realism, in turn, seems best positioned to explain 
why the CSDP was not designed more effectively, by emphasising the reluctance of states to 
transfer sovereignty to international organisations.
While these impediments on the CSDP’s effectiveness are unlikely to fully disappear, 
this article put forward two specific measures that could alleviate their impact on the pattern 
of operations deployed under its aegis. First, devising a CSDP-strategy would facilitate 
agreement on when and how an operation could be deployed and make it more difficult 
for member states not to contribute to operations. Second, amending the consensus rule 
would make the CSDP a more attractive framework, without infringing on the national 
sovereignty of the member states. Unfortunately, the latter seems very unlikely in the near 
future. Consequently, the future pattern of operational activity can be expected to resemble 
more closely that of the previous years: small-scale, unambitious operations, that do not 
provide the member states with clear security benefits.
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